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PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED BECAUSE IT WAS 
DENIED THE OPPORTUNITY OF PRESENTING EVIDENCE DURING THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE'S DETERMINATION OF THE FEE AWARD, AND 
AGAIN WHEN THE BOARD OF REVIEW CONSIDERED THE CLAIM WITHOUT 
HAVING THE RECORD AND WITHOUT ALLOWING PETITIONER A HEARING 
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not consider any 
evidence that supported Petitioner's attorney1s fees claim for 
services provided to the underlying claimant, Abraham Karbakhsh, in 
the unusually lengthy proceeding against his employer. Petitioner 
simply submitted an itemized billing statement and was never 
allowed a hearing or an opportunity to present affidavits or other 
evidence to support its claim. In determining Petitioner's rights, 
the ALJ relied solely upon the 25% limitation and the limited 
evidence available to him. 
Respondent clearly admits that the ALJ decided upon the issue 
1 
of Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees on June 2, 1992. 
(Respondent's brief at 5.) Petitioner appealed to the Board of 
Review (Board) and the Board affirmed the ALJfs decision on 
July 27, 1992. (Respondent's brief at 5.) It is instructive to 
reiterate that the underlying proceeding which gave rise to 
Petitioner's claim was legal representation of Abraham Karbakhsh. 
Karbakhsh's claim was denied by the ALJ in a decision dated 
March 26, 1992. (Respondent's brief at 4. ) Karbakhsh appealed to 
the Board. "A full transcript of the matter could not be made for 
the Board of Review, however, as some of the tapes made of the 
hearing were defective. The Board of Review remanded the matter to 
the ALJ in order to collect testimony and cross-examination lost 
due to the defective tapes." (Respondent's brief at 4, citations 
to the record omitted.) The Board affirmed the ALJ's decision on 
September 28, 1992. 
Despite not being in possession of even the record of 
Karbakhsh's hearing, the Board decided upon the merits of 
Petitioner's claim for attorney's fees. Furthermore, Petitioner 
was not permitted to present its own evidence even at this time. 
Again, the Board of Review chose to determine Petitioner's rights 
without providing a fair hearing or even the slightest opportunity 
to present evidence tending to support its claim. Respondent's 
assertion that the Board acted justifiably and gave Petitioner a 
proper hearing truly stretches the limits of logic, since the 
Petitioner was afforded absolutely no opportunity to present its 
case and the Board itself did not even have the record of the 
2 
hearings at the time. What forms the basis of the Board's decision 
is simply a mechanical application of the 25% rule, with total 
disregard to the individual facts of the underlying proceeding or 
the merits of Petitioner's claim. 
Given the incontrovertible fact that the Board acted in the 
absence of pertinent information, indeed the actual record of the 
underlying proceedings, and did not allow Petitioner any hearing 
whatsoever to defend its claim, Petitioner's due process rights 
were violated. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER WAS PRECLUDED BY THE BOARD OF REVIEW FROM INTRODUCING 
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS CLAIM TO SAFEGUARD ITS DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS 
Respondent's brief (at 23), refers to the §35-4-10(i) of the 
Utah Employment Security Act as providing the requisite authority 
that would have allowed Petitioner to request the Board for 
introducing additional evidence to safeguard their due process 
rights. Respondent further argues that despite the authority 
granted under said section, Petitioner did not avail of this 
provision, and implies that Petitioner should not be allowed to 
raise the due process argument now, when it arguably did not raise 
it at the proper time. (Respondent's brief at 22-24.) 
Respondent's reference to §35-4-10(i) is erroneous and after 
consulting with counsel for Respondent, Petitioner learned the 
citation should have been §35-4-10(1). Furthermore, Petitioner did 
attempt to secure a hearing to introduce evidence in support of its 
claim by writing directly to the Board of Review but was not 
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allowed a fair hearing or any proper opportunity to present its 
case (Page 6 of the Record). 
A. Respondent's reference to §35-4-10(1) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act as providing the authority for a 
request to the Board of Review to hear additional 
evidence is totally inappropriate 
To begin with, Respondent's concession that Petitioner could 
have made the due process argument under §35-4-10(1), albeit 
defective, does concede that Petitioner's due process rights were 
violated. Section 35-4-10(1) reads in pertinent part as follows: 
A review of a decision or determination involving 
contribution liability or applications for refund shall 
be made by the commission or its authorized 
representative in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter. The decision of the representative conducting 
the review is considered the decision of the commission. 
The commission or its authorized representative 
conducting the review may refer the matter to an 
administrative law judge, may decide the application for 
review on the basis of any facts and information as may 
be obtained, or may, in its discretion, hear argument or 
hold a hearing to secure further facts. After the 
review, notice of the decision shall be given to the 
employing unit. (Emphasis added). 
"Employing unit" as used in the above provision is defined in 
§35-4-22.1 and is generally any individual or legal entity who has 
one or more individuals performing services for it within this 
state. "Employing unit" in no wise refers to either the underlying 
claimant or the attorneys representing the claimant, as is the 
situation in the instant case. "Contribution liability" clearly 
refers to an employer who has been found liable for payment of 
unemployment taxes and who is contesting such a liability. 
Similarly, "refund" refers to a liable employer contesting 
liability for past or future payments to the employee. 
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Therefore, the above section is limited by its terms for the 
purposes of reviewing claims involving contribution liability or 
applications for refund of employer or employing unit liability. 
This section has absolutely no application to the case at hand 
since it is irrelevant to the claim of a claimant's attorney 
requesting a hearing to introduce additional evidence regarding 
fees charged and affording them due process. 
B. The Board did not allow Petitioner any hearing even after 
Petitioner had protested the ALJ's decision to the Board 
Respondent asserts that ,f[I]n the present case the attorneys 
never requested that the matter be remanded to the ALJ to accept 
evidence with regard to their fee,...." (Respondent's brief at 
24.) On the contrary, Petitioner definitely appealed to the Board 
to reverse the decision of the ALJ on the issue of fees. 
Petitioner's letter of June 12, 1992, (Respondent's brief, exhibit 
at appendix B, pages 4-5), clearly indicated to the Board the 
Petitioner's concerns regarding the unfairness of the decision. 
Under the Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-2(3), (appendix A-l), 
an appeal to the Board of Review from a decision of an ALJ should 
be on an appeal form and must include the name of the appellant, 
the name and social security number of the claimant, the 
identification of the case on which the appeal is being made, and 
the grounds upon which the appeal is being made. 
Petitioner's appeal of June 12, 1992, was made on its own 
letterhead instead of a departmental form but clearly included 
every single element required by R562-10d-2(3), including the 
grounds for the appeal. (Appendix B, 1.) Despite this notice, the 
5 
Board determined upon Petitioner's rights without even the benefit 
of the record of the underlying proceeding, and without providing 
a hearing to the Petitioner. 
Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-3(2)(a) clearly states that 
11
 [I] f the Board determines that additional evidence offered by a 
party was not available at the time of the hearing, the Board may 
remand the matter to an Administrative Law Judge for further 
hearing." In this case, even the bare minimum due process 
protection of any hearing whatsoever was not provided to the 
Petitioner. Typically, the determination of attorney's fees is 
made after the underlying disputes have been resolved. In the 
instant case, Petitioner was never afforded that hearing or any 
other opportunity to present its case because its claim was 
resolved before the underlying dispute of the claimant, Abraham 
Karbakhsh, and without the benefit of the record of that dispute. 
Therefore, the Board violated the Petitioner's due process rights. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF FACTUAL INACCURACIES IN THE 
BOARD'S ATTORNEY'S FEES DECISION AS MERE DICTA IS NOT ONLY 
INAPPROPRIATE BUT ALSO REAFFIRMS PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
BOARD ACTED UNFAIRLY AND ARBITRARILY 
Petitioner's earlier brief argues at length that the decision 
of the Board was not based upon any facts in the record and 
therefore should not be sustained. The decision of the Board 
totally failed to point out any evidence in the record that was 
used to objectively determine the validity of Petitioner's claim. 
This supports Petitioner's argument that the Board acted without 
the benefit of any record and solely on the strength of 
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Respondent's evidence. In fact, the reasons that were forwarded by 
the Board in justifying its decision were remarkably vague for the 
most part and completely inaccurate in certain instances. 
Petitioner has already objected to all these inaccuracies in its 
earlier brief. (Petitioner's brief at 23-25.) 
Respondent attempts to waive away Petitioner's objections by 
claiming that these inaccuracies were mere]y dicta and did not form 
the basis of the Board's decision. (Respondent's brief at 10-12.) 
Respondent's tacit admission about the inaccuracy of the Board's 
findings regarding the extent of Petitioner's services and the 
nature and complexity of the proceedings that generated those 
services, immediately raises serious doubts about the fairness of 
the Board's decision. 
Although Respondent characterizes the inaccuracies as dicta, 
it still cannot offer any evidence that the Board based its 
decision solely upon facts contained in the record. Therefore, 
Petitioner's claim that the Board's decision is not based upon 
facts solely contained in the record is further validated. 
POINT IV 
THE CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY RESPONDENT IN SUPPORT OF SUSTAINING 
THE 2 5% RULE IN INSTANT CASE IS INAPPOSITE AND UNRELATED TO 
PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT 
Respondent has devoted a considerable portion of its brief to 
the case of Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 695 P.2d 164 (Cal. 1985), 
and explaining its significance to instant case. Unlike Roa, 
Petitioner did not have a contingent fee arrangement with the 
underlying claimant Karbakhsh. This alone distinguishes Roa from 
7 
the present fact situation. Further, in this case, the statute 
provides that a greater fee may be allowed if necessary to protect 
the due process rights of the claimant at the extraordinary initial 
hearing. Petitioner clearly would have no basis for this appeal 
had the initial hearing gone only a few hours. However, since the 
hearing was continued twice and extended for more than 13 hours of 
hearing the Due Process Rights of the Claimant with respect to the 
Anti-discrimination Claim referred to at page 177 to 191 of the 
record or the wrongful discharge claim. Furthermore, unlike Roa, 
Petitioner is not challenging the constitutional validity of the 
25% rule, only the Board's application of the rule in instant case 
where the exception provided to the rule should have been employed. 
Respondent's use of National Association of Radiation 
Survivors et. al. v. Edward V. Derwinski, 994 F.2d 583 (1993), is 
similarly unsuitable because it does not relate to the protection 
of the due process rights of the parties involved. 
DATED this 7th day of March, 1994. 
yWS P. T U G A ^ 7 GARY' Et/ WE*OfaT (J 
attorney for Petitioner Attorney fj#r Petitioner 
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Utah Code Annotated, §35-4-22.1 
Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-2(3) 
Utah Administrative Code R562-10d-3(2)(a) 
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35-4-22.1 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 382 
other state as a part of a state-controlled system of 
public employment offices or by a federal agency 
charged with the administration of an unemployment 
compensation progTam or free public employment of-
fices 
(8) "Employment Security Administration Fund" 
means the Employment Security Administration 
Fund established by Section 35-4-14, and from which 
administrative expenses under this chapter shajl be 
paid 
(9) "Extended benefits" has the meaning specified 
in Subsection 35-4-3.5(g)(6) 
(10) "Fund" means the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Fund established by this chapter 
(11) ' Insured average annual wage" means on or 
before the 15th day of May of each year, the total 
wages of insured workers for the preceding calendar 
year, divided by the average monthly number of in-
sured workers, determined by dividing by 12 the total 
insured workers for the preceding calendar year as 
determined under the rules of the commission calcu-
lated to two decimal places, disregarding any fraction 
of one cent 
(12) "Insured average fiscal year wage" means on 
or before the 15th day of November of each year, the 
total wages of insured workers for the preceding fis-
cal year, divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers, determined by dividing by 12 the 
total insured workers for the preceding fiscal year as 
determined under the rules of the commission calcu-
lated to two decimal places, disregarding any fraction 
of one cent 
(13) "Insured average fiscal year weekly wage" 
means the insured average fiscal year wage deter-
mined in Subsection (12), divided by 52, calculated to 
two decimal places, disregarding any fraction of one 
cent 
(14) "Insured average weekly wage" means the in-
sured average annual wage determined in Subsection 
(11), divided by 52, calculated to two decimal places, 
disregarding any fraction of one cent 
(15) "Insured status" means that an individual 
has, during his base-period, performed services and 
earned wages in employment sufficient to qualify for 
benefits under Section 35-4-4 
(16) "Insured work" means employment for em-
ployers 
(17) "Monetary base period wage requirement" 
means Sc/e of the insured average fiscal year wage for 
the preceding fiscal year, for example, fiscal year 
1990 for individuals establishing benefit years in 
1991, rounded up to the next higher multiple of $100 
(18) "State" includes the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Colum-
bia 
(19) "Week" means the period or periods of seven 
consecutive calendar days as the commission may 
pi escribe by rule 1993 
35-4-22.1. Employ ing uni ts . 
(1) "Employing unit ' means any individual or type 
of organization including any partnership, associa-
tion, trust, estate, joint stock company, insurance 
company, or corporation, whether domestic or for-
eign, or the receiver, trustee in bankruptcy, trustee 
or successor of any of the foregoing, or the legal repre-
sentative of a deceased person, which has or subse-
quent to January 1, 1935, had one or more individ-
uals performing services for it within this state 
(2) All individuals performing services within this 
state for any employing unit which maintains two or 
more separate establishments within this state are 
considered to be performing services for a single em-
ploying unit for ail the purposes of this chapter 
(3) Each individual employed to perform or to as-
sist in performing the work of any person in the ser-
vice of an employing unit is considered to be engaged 
b\ the employing unit for all the purposes of this 
chapter whether the individual was hired or paid di-
rectly by the employing unit or by the person, pro-
vided the employing unit had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the work 
(4) "Hospital" means an institution which is li-
censed, certified, or approved by the Department of 
Health as a hospital 
(5) "Institution of higher education," for the pur-
poses of this section, means an educational institu-
tion which 
(a) d) admits, as regular students only, indi-
viduals having a certificate of graduation 
from a high school or the recognized equiva-
lent of a certificate, 
(n) is legally authorized in this state to 
provide a program of education beyond high 
school, 
(in) provides an educational program for 
which it awards a bachelor's or higher de-
gree, or provides a program which is accept-
able for full credit toward tha t degree, a pro-
gram of postgraduate or postdoctoral studies, 
or a program of training to prepare students 
for gainful employment in a recognized occu-
pation, and 
dv) is a public or other nonprofit institu-
tion 
(b) All colleges and universities in this state 
are institutions of higher education for purposes 
of this section. 
(6) (a) "Temporary services employer" or "leasing 
employer" is an employing unit that contracts 
with clients or customers to supply workers to 
perform services for the client or customer and 
directly or indirectly performs the following func-
tions 
d) negotiates with clients or customers for 
matters such as time, place, type of work, 
working conditions, quality, and price of the 
services, 
(n) determines assignments or reassign-
ments of workers even though workers re-
tain the right to refuse specific assignments, 
(in) retains the authority to assign or re-
assign a worker to other clients or customers 
when a worker is determined unacceptable 
by a specific client or customer, 
dv) sets the rate of pay of the worker 
whether or not through negotiation, 
(v) pays the worker from its own account, 
and 
(vi) retains the right to hire and termi-
nate workers 
(b) If an individual or entity contracts to sup-
pl\ an employee to perform services for a cus-
tomer or client and is a leasing employer or a 
temporary services employer, the individual or 
entity is the employer of the employee who per-
forms the services If the individual or entity is 
not a leasing employer or a temporary services 
employer, it pays the wages as the agent of the 
employer 
(c) In circumstances in which an employee is 
loaned from one employer to another employer, 
and direction and control of the manner and 
means of performing the services changes to the 
R562-10d-2. Appeals to the Board. 
1. Appeals as of Right 
If the Administrative Law Judge's decision did not affirm a prior 
decision, the Board will accept a timely appeal from any party to 
that decision. 
2. Appeals Not Accepted by the Board 
The Board of Review has the discretion not to accept an appeal if 
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge affirms a prior 
decision of the Department. Prior to making a determination not to 
accept an appeal , a review will be made of the record by an 
individual designated by the Board. 
3. Filing an Appeal 
a. An appeal to the Board of Review from a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge must be on an appeal form provided by the 
Department, or a written statement which includes: 
(1) The name of the appellant, 
(2) The name and social security number of the claimant in cases 
involving benefit rights, 
(3) The identification of the case on which the appeal is being 
made, 
(4) The grounds upon which the appeal is made. However, the 
issues presented in the appeal are not limited to the issues 
presented at the hearing. Further, the review by the Board will 
not be limited to the issues raised by the appeal. The appeal may 
be accompanied by references to or excerpts from the record made 
before the Administrative Law Judge. 
R562-10d-3. Board of Review of Administrative Law Judge Decisions. 
1. Notice that An Appeal Has Been Filed 
All parties entitled to receive the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge will receive notice from the Department 
that an appeal has been filed with the Board of Review. 
2. Consideration by the Board 
a. The Board of Review will not take additional evidence. If 
the Board determines that additional evidence offered by a party 
was not available at the time of the hearing, the Board may remand 
the matter to an Administrative Law Judge for further hearing. The 
Board may also remand a matter for the taking of new evidence if, 
in the discretion of the Board, such evidence is of particularly 
significant importance that the Board determines its inclusion in 
the record is necessary for proper administration of the Act. 
b. At its discretion, the Board may also remand a case to an 
Administrative Law Judge or Department representative for other 
action as deemed appropriate. 
3. Presentation of Argument 
In its review of an appeal, the Board of Review may in its 
discretion allow the parties to file written arguments. When 
written arguments are allowed, the parties will be granted 15 days 
from the date of notification to submit their arguments. No other 
argument will be allowed, unless the Board determines that 
A-l 
additional written argument is necessary to a proper understanding 
of the appeal. 
R562-10d-4. Notice of Decisions from the Board of Review. 
1. A copy of the decision of the Board of Review, including an 
explanation of the right to judicial review, will be promptly 
delivered or mailed to each interested party. 
2. In each case where the Board of Review declines to accept an 
appeal, the findings of fact and decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge will be deemed to be the findings and decision of the Board 
of Review and will be subject to judicial review upon action 
commenced within ten days after the decision of the Board of Review 
declining acceptance of the appeal has become final. 
(c) 1990, 1991, 1993 By The Michie Company 
A-2 
CONCLUSION TO REPLY BRIEF 
The record on appeal clearly demonstrates that following the 
initial hearing of Claimant, Karbakhsh case, there were no 
evidentiary hearings where Petitioner could have presented 
evidence in support of its request for its petition for approval 
of fees. It is also clear that the Board of Review considered 
evidence adduced in the underlying case following the petition 
for approval of fees as recited in its decision. Respondents 
references to the Utah Code are not applicable to a hearing on a 
petition for fees. There was no hearing conducted on the issue 
of fees, nor was one available which would have met the 
requirements of due process. Petitioner requests that the Court 
reverse the decision of the board of review and award Petitioner 
attorney's fees of $4,3 00.00. Alternatively, Petitioner requests 
that decision of the Board of Review be reversed and that an 
evidentiary hearing be conducted by an administrative law judge 
on Petitioner's petition for its fees. 
DATED this 16th Day of March 1994 
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